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The U.S. Move to International
Accounting Standards A Matter of Cultural Discord How do we Reconcile?
NEAL F. NEWMAN*

"Convergence is, from the accounting andfinancial reporting
world's viewpoint, the single most important thing in the history
of the world. "'
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I. INTRODUCTION

We live in a world that continues to evolve. Technology
continues to break down walls and transcend barriers. Today, investors, issuers, and other market participants can engage in financial transactions across national boundaries and make investments,
capital allocations, and financing decisions on a global basis more
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readily than ever before. This is due in large measure to today's
ever-faster communications and ever-more-closely linked markets.2 What has not kept pace with this global transformation,
however, is the language by which companies communicate, the
language of accounting and financial reporting.
What exists presently is a worldwide accounting structure
consisting of two major regimes. U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("U.S. GAAP" or "GAAP") governs companies formed and operating inside the United States.3 All publicly
held companies registered with the SEC must prepare and present
their financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP.4 The
other major accounting regime is International Financial Reporting
Standards ("IFRS"). To date, over 100 countries have adopted and
now use some form of IFRS.5
It is inefficient for two major accounting standards to govern provinces around the world. Currently, U.S. issuers operate
under one set of accounting standards, and a large part of the world
operates under some customized version of IFRS.6 Likewise,
global companies operating within different accounting provinces
must often use different accounting standards for each of the jurisdictions in which they operate; a costly, cumbersome, and time

2. Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers,
73 Fed. Reg. 70,816, 70,818 (proposed Nov. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230, 240, 244, 249) [hereinafter IFRS Roadmap], available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8982fr.pdf.
IFRS Roadmap, supra note 2, at 70,819.
3.
4. IFRS Roadmap, supra note 2.
IFRS Roadmap, supra note 2.
5.
The term "customized" refers to the fact that local provinces at times
6.
will adopt IFRS standards but will then revise those standards to fit provincial
preferences. See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Use of IFRS by Jurisdiction,
http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (summarizing which companies have adopted IFRS and how the local provinces may
have modified those standards from original form as promulgated by the IASB);
see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accounting Vision: A
RealisticAppraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1, 21 (2008) ("There is
variation in the basis of reporting used. Most companies report using IFRS as
published by [the International Accounting Standards Board] (IASB). However,
the vast majority of these companies also assert that statements comply with
various country-specific variations of IFRS.").
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consuming endeavor.' Various entities responsible for the many
factions of accounting standard setting and financial reporting,
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board8 ("FASB"), the
SEC, 9 and the International Accounting Standards Board °
("IASB"), (collectively, "Accounting Standard Setters") have been
aware of this issue since the late 1960s" and have further recognized the need for change.' 2 The world's economies have continued to converge, a dynamic which has galvanized the Accounting
Standard Setters, prompting them to renew their quest of world
7. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements
Prepared in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,962, 37,966 (proposed July
11, 2007) [hereinafter IFRS Financial Statement Acceptance], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/33-8818fr.pdf
("[T]he Commission
noted that for issuers wishing to raise capital in more than one country, compliance with differing accounting requirements to be used in the preparation of
financial statements increased compliance costs and created inefficiencies.").
8. The FASB is the independent, private-sector body with SECdelegated authority to draft accounting standards that accord with U.S. GAAP.
See Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8221; 34-47743
(Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Policy Statement]; Statement of Policy on the
Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973) (expressing the SEC's intent to
continue to look to the private sector for leadership in establishing and improving accounting principles and standards through the FASB). For more information about the FASB, see Financial Accounting Standards Board,
http://www.fasb.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
9. Congress gave the SEC authority under the federal securities laws to
establish accounting principles for enterprises falling under its jurisdiction.
DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRET, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 156
(4th ed. 2006).
10. See Welcome to IASB.org, http://www.iasb.org/home.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009). The IASB is a stand-alone, privately-funded accounting
standard-setting body established to develop global standards for financial reporting. Id.
11.
See MFRS Financial Statement Acceptance, supra note 7, at 37,962.
The SEC first addressed discrepancies in financial information provided under a
foreign basis of accounting in 1967. Id.
12. IFRS Roadmap, supra note 2, at 70,818 (recognizing that capital
markets have become increasingly global in nature, and acknowledging that a
single set of standards would increase comparability between companies around
the world).
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adherence to one set of "high-quality global accounting standards."' 3
The United States, however, is one of the few remaining
provinces that has yet to convert to IFRS. 14 The United States has
operated under GAAP since the early 1970s, 5 and the circumstances prompting the United States to consider a change are not
necessarily due to glaring deficiencies in U.S. GAAP, but are more
attributable to the need for the United States to remain relevant in
the global marketplace.1 6 The United States is no longer the preferred choice for raising capital. Today, companies can raise
needed capital just as easily in London, Hong Kong, or Dubai rather than New York."7 Consequently, the United States is in the
unaccustomed position of "following suit" as worldwide momentum towards adopting IFRS grows daily, and the United States faces the prospect of becoming increasingly less relevant in the world
marketplace if it continues to resist the prevailing trends in financial accounting. In November 2008, in what some might interpret
as a reactive measure, the SEC proposed making a decision in
2011 to mandate IFRS adoption with a planned phase-in of adoption dates-2014 for larger accelerated filers, 2015 for mid-sized
companies, and 2016 for small companies."
We must appreciate, however, that in light of recent events,
namely the brunt of the economic crisis in the latter part of 2008,
the United States and its contemplated conversion to IFRS is a fluIFRS Roadmap, supra note 2, at 70,817.
13.
14.
See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Use of IFRS by Jurisdiction,
http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (noting
which countries have converted to IFRS, and major provinces that have yet to
adopt IFRS, including Canada, China, India, Japan and Mexico).
See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts about FASB,
15.
http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (explaining how U.S.
GAAP as we know it today was developed in earnest starting in the early 1970s
with the creation of the FASB). The FASB came into existence in 1973 and has
been the entity primarily responsible for developing accounting standards in the
United States. Id.
See generally Cunningham, supra note 6 (providing a discussion
16.
regarding the United States and its quest to stay competitive in the global marketplace as the force driving the United States toward considering conversion to

IFRS).
17.
Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv., 191, 195 (2008).
IFRS Roadmap, supra note 2, at 70,824.
18.
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id situation. The incumbent Obama administration has in fact
hinted that it will revisit projects such as IFRS as well as other financial and regulatory matters, although, to date, the administration has made no firm commitments on the matter.' 9 For now, the
United States' conversion to IFRS is still a prominent issue, and
some see it as a key component in the United States remaining relevant in the global marketplace.20 In that regard, the FASB and
the IASB continue their joint convergence effort to develop a
common set of "high quality global accounting standards"2 ' to
which most provinces having a global footprint ideally would adhere.22
The United States is now focused on converting to IFRS
but it seems as if the United States is either overlooking or superficially dealing with a major variable in the equation: the threshold
question of the U.S. suitability for IFRS. Simply put, accounting
under IFRS represents a different way of doing things, and asking
U.S. issuers to comport with IFRS standards will require drastic
changes. The United States is asking its issuers to leave an accounting regime under which they have been operating for several

19.
Steven Marcy, Accounting Principles: Fair Value Controversy to
Color Major Accounting Issues in 2009, SEC. L. DAILY, Jan. 29, 2009. Mary
Schapiro, the SEC Chairman designee, expressed hesitation toward moving
forward with IFRS. Id. She noted that the lack of detail in IFRS standards
"leaves much to interpretation," and noted the extraordinary costs that would be
involved in converting to IFRS. Id. She was not definitive one way or the other, however, observing that there is still strong support on both sides for and
against converting to IFRS. Id.
20. Id. Robert Mednick, retired former chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and managing partner of Andersen Worldwide, expressed these sentiments in response to a survey posited to prominent
members of the accounting and financial reporting community. Id. He and
others see U.S. conversion to IFRS as inevitable, with the main issues being the
matter of how and when the actual change will occur. Id.
21.
See A Roadmap for Convergence Between IFRSs and US GAAP2006-2008 Memorandum of Understanding Between the FASB and the IASB
(2006), available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/874B63FB-56DB-4B78B7AF-49BBA 18C98D9/0/MoU.pdf.
22.
See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Use of IFRS by Jurisdiction,
http://www.iasplus.comicountry/useias.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (listing
those countries that, to date, have adopted IFRS to varying degrees).
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decades 3 and to adopt and apply a methodology that is very different from the accounting world to which they have grown accustomed.
This Article explores this overlooked variable by taking a
step back to explore the threshold question of whether IFRS is a
suitable companion for the United States and its publicly held corporations. This Article argues that IFRS is a poor fit for the United
States, both culturally and demographically. The United States has
a shareholder demographic and a corporate culture that would not
reconcile well with the principles-based tenants of IFRS. This Article will outline how some entrenched U.S. practices, such as the
improper use of incentive-based compensation, and other issues,
such as the United States' broad and diverse shareholder base,
create impediments to the United States' ability to fully embrace
and successfully adopt an accounting regime like IFRS. The overall goal of this Article is to encourage stakeholders in the accounting and financial reporting process to re-examine how they view
the financial reporting process and consider what unconventional
methods they may employ to achieve better outcomes, regardless
of the prevailing accounting regime.
In exploring these issues, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part II frames the issue, explaining by analogy the fundamental
differences between GAAP and IFRS and what challenges those
differences will pose for U.S. issuers applying IFRS. Part III takes
the abstract analogy in Part II and puts it into concrete form by
analyzing specific GAAP provisions and comparing those provisions with their IFRS corollaries. Part III explains how the standards are different under the two regimes and then explains how
these differences may pose challenges for U.S. issuers in the event
the United States mandates conversion from GAAP to IFRS. Part
IV examines the U.S. financial reporting culture to explain exactly
why IFRS may not be a suitable fit for the U.S. issuer. Part IV also
highlights certain aspects of the U.S. corporate culture as being
root causes in why IFRS may not be a good cultural fit for IFRS.
Part V explores possible solutions to these issues and suggests an
alternative to the use of incentive-based compensation. Part V
proposes the unusual suggestion of incentivizing accurate financial
reporting by means of basing a portion of an executive's compen23. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts about FASB
http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
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sation contingent upon the quality of that corporation's financial
reporting. Incentivizing accurate financial reporting admittedly
would be a difficult undertaking but is a practice that arguably
would properly align incentives and achieve better outcomes in the
quality of financial reporting. Part VI concludes by summarizing
the arguments and making a final case for corporations using incentive-based compensation to incentivize accurate financial reporting as a means to create a better environment for IFRS in the
United States.
II.

IFRS: A POOR CULTURAL

FIT FOR THE UNITED STATES-

FRAMING THE ISSUE

IFRS is not a good cultural fit for U.S. issuers due to fundamental differences between GAAP and IFRS which do not reconcile well. Generally speaking, GAAP is primarily a rules-based
accounting regime permeated by quantified numerical thresholds
and bright line tests of form." A typical U.S. GAAP pronouncement couples the accounting standard with a host of pronounce-

24. See STAFF OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY PURSUANT
TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION
BY THE U.S. FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (2003) [hereinafter SOX REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm. The SEC, pursuant
to section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, underwent a study exploring the idea of the United States adopting a Principles-Based Accounting System. Id. The study cited a number of concerns with the United States' current
process of accounting standard setting, including the following:
Contain numerous bright-line tests, which ultimately can be
misused by financial engineers as a roadmap to comply with
the letter but not the spirit of standards;
Contain numerous exceptions to the principles purportedly
underlying the standards, resulting in inconsistencies in accounting treatment of transactions and events with similar
economic substance, and;
Further a need and demand for voluminously detailed implementation guidance on the application of the standard, creating
complexity in and uncertainty about the application of the
standard.
Id. at Part I.A.
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ments, interpretive releases, and implementation guidance.' U.S.
GAAP evolved into a regime designed to narrow the scope and
define the parameters for most accounting transactions to provide
U.S. issuers with bright line tests and clearly chartered road maps
to follow for virtually any accounting transaction.26 U.S. GAAP
evolved in this fashion because U.S. issuers and their certified public accountants demand as much, as they seek to obviate their burden of making accounting judgments in cases of uncertainty.27
FRS takes a principles-based accounting approach contrary to the U.S. GAAP's rules-based orientation. The underlying
bases of IFRS are standards that are principled in nature 28 instead
of a set of bright line rules and detailed compliance guidance. The
following example will help clarify the distinguishing characteristics between a rules-based and a principles-based standard.
A rules-based standard would read as follows: "Speed Limit
70.",29 Accordingly, under this rules-based standard, motorists have
a clear guideline to follow. The motorist knows with certainty that
as long as he is traveling at a rate of seventy miles per hour or
slower, he is operating within the law's confines. A rules-based
regime provides certainty, predictability, consistency and, arguably, comparability. Conversely, under a principles-based regime
the guideline might be worded something akin to "Drive at a reasonable rate of speed given the present conditions."0 Instead of a
bright line (70 miles per hour) that clearly marks a legal versus an
illegal rate of speed, under a principles-based regime, no clear outer boundary exists. The onus is then on the motorist to determine
25. See From The FASB Report: December 24, 2002, The Revenue Recognition Project, 1-2, http://72.3.243.42/project/tfr-articledec_2002.pdf (last
visited Apr. 7, 2009).
26. See SOX REPORT, supra note 24, at Part BI.A.
27. William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles,and the Accounting Crisis in
the United States, 5 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 7, 30 (2004).
28.

See

INTERNATIONAL

SEC.

AND

EXCH.

ACCOUNTING

COMM'N,

STANDARDS

SEC

CONCEPT

(2009),

RELEASE:

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-42430.htm.
29. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescriptionto Retire the Rhetoric
of "Principles-BasedSystems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and
Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2007) (explaining the difference

between rules-based and principles-based standards using the 55 mile per hour
speed limit as an example).
30. Id.
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a "reasonable rate of speed given the present conditions." Under
this principles-based regime, the motorist now must use both discretion and judgment. The motorist must take into consideration
the time of day, the volume of traffic flow, weather conditions,
etc., and process this data to make a determination as to what constitutes a "reasonable rate of speed given the present conditions."
The principles-based guideline elicits several disconcerting
uncertainties. What if the motorist's determination of what speed
is reasonable under the circumstances is different than the state
trooper's assessment and the state trooper subsequently cites the
motorist for exceeding that "reasonableness?" If the motorist were
to contest the ticket, how would a judge determine innocence or
guilt? Would "reasonableness" therefore have to be reconstituted
to incorporate an array of acceptable speed ranges dictated by external factors such as time of day, weather conditions, and traffic
flow? Assuming that such reconstituting did occur, a principlesbased guideline would still require the trier of fact to insert his or
her judgment to make an assessment as to whether the driver's actual rate of speed was reasonable.
The above example gives a distilled version of the myriad
issues, enforcement dilemmas, and consistency challenges that will
befall the U.S. accounting and regulatory system in the more fluid
IFRS environment. It is this very dynamic of "fluidity" that posits
the question whether IFRS would be a good fit for the U.S. financial and reporting culture absent some of the paradigm shifting
suggestions set forth herein.
Il.

THE GAAP vs. IFRS COMPARISON-A CLOSER LOOK

It is useful first to take a closer look at U.S. GAAP and
IFRS to understand how the two regimes differ. At the outset, it is
instructive to recognize the differing volumes of information currently comprising U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Presently, U.S. GAAP
consists of three volumes comprising some 4,530 pages. Some of
31.
The FASB is currently undertaking a project referred to as "Codification," in which the FASB is consolidating all authoritative U.S. GAAP into one
body of information. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS CODIFICATION Tm NOTICE TO CONSTITUENTS (V 1.05) 5 (2009),
availableat http://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/10/5724610.pdf. On July 1, 2009, the

FASB expects to formally approve the Codification as the single source of authoritative U.S. accounting and reporting standards. Id. At that time, the Codi-
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the FASB rules explaining how to book a single transaction comprise over 700 pages.32 By contrast the volume of information
comprising IFRS is much more modest. LFRS standards consist of
one 2,719 page publication incorporating eight International Financial Reporting Standards, forty-one International Accounting
Standards ("IAS"), and twenty-five pronouncements offering interpretive guidance.33 Each standard and interpretation is approximately one to eight pages in length34
A. Debate on the Rules-Based vs. Principles-BasedDistinction
To present all sides of the debate, some scholars challenge
the notion that U.S. GAAP is strictly a rules-based regime and that
IFRS is strictly a principles-based regime.35 Professor Lawrence
A. Cunningham argues that U.S. GAAP and LFRS both move
along "a continuum rather than precisely fitting

. . .

into two neat

categories., 36 In other words, Professor Cunningham argues that
U.S. GAAP and IFRS each have their fair share of both rulesbased and principles-based accounting standards, and it is wrong to
categorize either regime as exclusively rules-based or principlesbased.37 Professor Cunningham has valid points. Designating either accounting regime as exclusively rules-based or exclusively
principles-based is an overstatement since there are very few absolutes in the world. However, Professor Cunningham's contention
notwithstanding, it is clear that the two regimes are based on very
different underlying premises. U.S. GAAP is still replete with
many rules-based accounting standards as the U.S. issuer continues
to seek prescriptive guidance to resolve accounting issues with
fication will supersede all then-existing non-SEC accounting and reporting standards. Id. Once this effort is finalized, it will make accessing U.S. GAAP a
more simplified and streamlined process. Id. at 6.
32.
Alter Wriston, The Solution to Scandals? Simpler Rules, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 5, 2002, at A10.
See generally INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL
33.
FINANCIAL

REPORTING

STANDARDS

(IFRS)

INCLUDING

INTERNATIONAL

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (1ASS) AND INTERPRETATIONS AS APPROVED (2008)
[hereinafter IFRS].
34.
Id. at 1.
See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescriptionto Retire the
35.
Rhetoric of "Principles-BasedSystems" in CorporateLaw, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007).
36.
Id. at 1413.
37.
Id.
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road maps marked as clearly as possible.38 IFRS's underlying
premise is that its standards will be "principled" in nature, essentially avoiding bright line tests, alternative accounting treatments,
or quantified thresholds.39 IFRS accounting standards intend to
give corporations sufficient guidance to capture the "economic
essence" of a transaction. 4 IFRS aims to avoid a mere "check the
box" approach to financial reporting and instead requires financial
statement preparers be more thoughtful in assuring that what they
are reporting in the financial statements is a true and substantive
reflection of that corporation's financial position.4 1
To help crystallize the debate on this issue, the following
sections compare selected U.S. GAAP and IFRS standards to highlight the rules-based versus principles-based distinctions existing
between the two regimes. The compared standards tend to have a

Compare FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN.
38.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 13 - ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES n 6-7 (1976),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl3.pdf (77 pages long, including 13
pages of examples), with INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 17: LEASES,
in IFRS, supra note 33, at 1417 (thirty three pages and two pages of implemenation guidance); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 94 - CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY-OWNED

SUBSIDIARIES (23 pages long); INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 27:
CONSOLIDATED AND SEPARATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, in IFRS, supra note

33, at 1417 (incorporating two pages of guidance).
39.
For example, Statement of Financial Accounting No. 13 under U.S.
GAAP has a number of bright-line quantifying thresholds that determine when a
company can account for an asset as an operating lease versus a capital lease.
See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 13 - ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES U 7c-d (1976),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl3.pdf. In contrast, the IFRS corollary,
IAS 17, sets forth an accounting standard on the same subject matter but gives
no quantifying thresholds. See InternationalAccounting Standard 17: Leases,
in supra note 33, at 1157. For a discussion of the differences between GAAP
and IFRS when accounting for leases, see infra Part III.B.
40. Each IFRS standard starts by stating the standard's objective. For
example, International Accounting Standard 27's stated objectives are "to enhance the relevance, reliability and comparability of the information that a parent entity provides in its separate financial statements and in its consolidated
financial statements for a group of entities under its control." International
Accounting Standard17: Leases, in IFRS, supra note 33, at 1157.
41.
Id. at 1420.
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significant financial statement impact on a corporation's balance
sheet and/or income statement.
B. Lease Accounting Treatment-U.S. GAAP vs. IFRS
The accounting standards for leases illustrate how the standards differ under GAAP and IFRS. Prominent items on a corporation's balance sheet are expenditures related to the procurement
of property, plant, or equipment. ' A corporation may use these
items from five to forty-five years.43 Corporations will typically
lease these assets on a long-term basis instead of purchasing these
items outright because the cash outlay related to these items is often considerable." Accordingly, the method used to account for
these long-term lease obligations can have a significant impact on
a corporation's financials.
The threshold question and major issue regarding a lease
obligation is whether the corporation will have to account for the
transaction as an operating lease or a capital lease, as that determination has a significant impact on what the corporation must report
in terms of debt obligations, assets, expenses, etc.45 If the transaction is a capital lease, the corporation must account for the transaction as if the corporation is acquiring the asset, which in turn en-46
tails reporting a long-term debt obligation on its balance sheet.
The capital lease election affects many key financial ratios that
analysts use to determine the corporation's financial health.47 Alternatively, if the corporation can account for the transaction as an
42.
See Home Depot, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 37 (Apr. 11, 2005).
"Property, Plant & Equipment" (net of accumulated depreciation) represented
56% of Home Depot's total assets. Id.
43.
See id. at 42. For example, Home Depot's depreciation for "Buildings" ranges from ten to forty-five years; depreciation for "Furniture, Fixtures
and Equipment" ranges from three to twenty years; and depreciation for "Leasehold Improvements" ranges from five to thirty years. Id.
44. See id. at 37.
45.
See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 13-AcCOUNTING FOR LEASES V 6-7
(1976), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas 13.pdf.
46.
See generally id. 1 10.
47.
For example, a key analyst ratio is the debt to equity ratio, which
measures the amount of debt in relation to the corporation's equity. DAVID R.
HERWiTZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 348 (4th ed.

2006). When a corporation is required to record a lease as a capital lease, this
ratio becomes less favorable. Id.
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operating lease, the corporation need only expense the lease payments in the period in which the corporation incurs those expenses
and can thus avoid including the lease as a long-term debt obligation on its balance sheet." The lower the reported debt obligation,
the better the corporation's perceived financial health. 49 The corporation's healthy financial perception will presumably produce a
corresponding increase in the market price for its shares. Accordingly, the stakes can be high for corporations based on the accounting treatment available, which is contingent upon the transaction' s nature.
Overall, accounting for leases under GAAP and IFRS are
similar. The GAAP standard has components that use quantified
thresholds, whereas the IFRS standard is stated in principled terms
only. Both standards look at the transaction's nature and require
the issuer to elect the less-favored capital lease treatment if certain
criteria are present. 0 The biggest difference between the two standards (not surprisingly) is the nature of the criteria triggering capital or operating lease accounting treatment. Under U.S. GAAP, the
criteria triggering capital lease accounting treatment are quantified
thresholds that specifically outline when an issuer may account for
a transaction as an operating lease, or when the issuer must elect
the less-favored capital lease accounting treatment.51 By contrast,
the standards under the more principally based IFRS do not give
quantified measures or thresholds.
The accounting treatment of leases under GAAP and IFRS
are the same in certain situations. If the lease transfers property
ownership at the end of the lease term, then both GAAP and IFRS
require capital lease accounting treatment.53 Likewise, both standards require capital lease accounting treatment if the lessee has
48.

See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 45,

15.
49.
Debt is a fixed payment obligation that the corporation is obliged to
repay. HERWrZ & BARRETr, supra note 47, at 15-16. Corporations often have
to forego or defer opportunities because the corporation must use that cash to
satisfy debt obligations. Id.
50.
InternationalAccounting Standard 17: Leases, in IFRS, supra note
33, at 1165; FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 45, 1 7(a-d).
51.
Id. 7, 10.
52.
InternationalAccounting Standard 17: Leases, in IFRS, supra note
33,1 10(a)-(e), at 1165.
53.
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 45, 10.
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the option to purchase the asset at a price sufficiently lower than
the asset's fair market value on the date the option becomes exercisable.m
However, the two standards diverge when the capital versus operating lease determination hinges on the lease term or the
lease's value. In these situations GAAP provides bright line criteria and quantified thresholds, whereas IFRS states the same idea
but in principled terms. Under GAAP, if the lease term is equal to
seventy-five percent or more of the leased property's economic
life, then the issuer must account for the lease as a capital lease.55
The IFRS equivalent addresses this same lease term issue but
without quantification.56 IAS 17 requires capital lease accounting
treatment if "the lease term is for the major part of the economic
life of the asset, even if title is not transferred. 57 GAAP specifically quantifies a property's useful economic life; IFRS requires a
corporation to determine the "majorpart of the economic life of the
asset."58
The other distinction between GAAP and IFRS's accounting treatment of leases deals with the scheduled lease payments
required under the lease as compared to the property's fair market
value. GAAP requires capital lease accounting treatment if the
present value of the lease payments equals ninety percent of the
property's fair market value.5 9 A corporation must make this assessment at the lease's inception.60 In comparison, the IFRS standard states this regulation in principled terms only. IAS 17 requires capital lease accounting treatment if, at the lease's inception, the present value of the minimum lease payments amounts to
at least "substantiallyall" of the fair value of the leased asset.

54.
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 45, I9n 5(d), 7(b); InternationalAccounting Standard 17: Leases, in IFRS, supra note 33, 10(b) at
1165.
55.
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 45,1 7(c).
56.
InternationalAccounting Standard 17: Leases, in IFRS, supra note

33, 10(a)-(e).
57.
58.
59.

Id. 1 10 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 45,1 7(d).

60.

Id.

61.
InternationalAccounting Standard 17: Leases, in IFRS, supra note
33, 10 (emphasis added).
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It is likely that U.S. issuers would account for leases under
IFRS guidelines by tracking closely the quantified thresholds already established under U.S. GAAP, but it will be interesting to
see how U.S. issuers will actually apply the IFRS standard related
to leases when the quantified thresholds under U.S. GAAP no
longer exist. Will the U.S. issuer view the less-prescriptive IFRS
guideline as an opportunity to push that outer boundary even further? Again, what happens when the issuer's assessment as to
what constitutes a "major part of the economic life of the asset" is
different from the accounting standard setters' assessments?
C. Revenue Recognition-U.S. GAAP vs. IFRS
Revenue recognition is another prominent item in the accounting and financial reporting world and is perhaps the most
important item in a corporation's financial statements. A corporation's ability to generate revenue is as vital to that organization's
sustained life as the pumping of the human heart. If the corporation fails to generate sufficient revenues to sustain its operations,
the corporation will die. Revenue reporting's critical nature makes
it inherently prone to abuse, manipulation, or outright fraud.
The foundations for revenue recognition standards under
IFRS and U.S. GAAP are similar. Both IFRS and U.S. GAAP do
not recognize revenue until it is realized (or realizable) and
earned. 63 Accordingly, most transactions related to revenue are
straightforward, and any distinctions between IFRS and U.S.
GAAP are inapplicable. In the basic scenario for the sale of goods,
for example, recognizing revenue is proper when the goods in
question have been delivered to or purchased by the buyer, and the
seller has relinquished all the risks and rewards of ownership. 64
See ERNST & YOUNG, U.S. GAAP v. IFRS: THE BASIcS 24 (2007),
62.
available at http://www2.eycom.ch/publications/items/2007_ey-us-gaap-v-ifrs
_basics/2007_ey-us-gaapv-ifrs basics.pdf. "In practice, while FAS 13 specifies bright lines in certain instances (for example 75% of economic life), IAS
17's general principles are interpreted similarly to the bright lines tests. As a
result, lease classification is often the same under FAS 13 and IAS 17." Id. at
21.
63.
See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,436,
74,437 (2003) [hereinafter SEC Staff Bulletin No. 104]; InternationalAccounting Standard 18: Revenue, in IFRS, supra note 33, 14(a)-(c).
64.
SEC Staff Bulletin No. 104, supra note 63, at 74,437 ("An entity's
revenue-earning activities involve delivering or producing goods, rendering
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Likewise, in rendering services, recognizing revenue is appropriate
when the services in question have been performed. 65 Accordingly,
under LFRS or U.S. GAAP, the general standards under either regime will cover many transactions.
Nevertheless, there are significant differences between revenue recognition under IFRS and U.S. GAAP which can lead to
significant differences in reported revenues under the two regimes.6 For example, U.S. GAAP has more than 140 pieces of
authoritative literature relating to revenue recognition. 67 U.S.
GAAP provides both general 68 and industry specific guidelines on
revenue recognition. 69 Additionally, under U.S. GAAP there are a
number of different accounting constituencies, each with different
degrees of authority that weigh in on the matter of revenue recognition.7 0 Each pronouncement "focuses on a specific practice problem and has a narrow scope, and the guidance is not always consistent across pronouncements. 7 '
services, or other activities that constitute its ongoing major or central operations, and revenues are considered to have been earned when the entity has substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented
by the revenues."); see International Accounting Standard 18: Revenue, in
IFRS, supra note 33, 20.
65.
See SEC Staff Bulletin No. 104, supra note 63, at 74,437; InternationalAccounting Standard 18: Revenue, in IFRS,supra note 33, 121.
66.
Cunningham, supra note 6, at 20-21 (noting that out of the 130 SEC
Filings covering fiscal year 2006 by foreign private issuers containing IMRS
reports reconciled to U.S. GAAP, only two reported identical income amounts).
The variations tended to result in higher IFRS earnings than U.S. GAAP, with
eighty-four issuers reporting higher earnings under IFRS, and forty-four issuers
reporting lower earnings under IFRS. Id. The wide variation is attributable to
enduring differences between IFRS and US GAAP. Id. at 23.
67.
From The FASB Report: December 24, 2002, The Revenue Recognition Project 1, http://72.3.243.42/project/tfr-article dec_2002.pdf (last visited
Apr. 7,2009).
68.
See SEC Staff Bulletin No. 104, supra note 63, at 74,437. All
publicly-held companies must at least follow the guidelines under SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 104. Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Shrikant Sortur, Revenue Recognition, in THE CHARTERED
AccouNTANT 1414 (2006),availableat http://www.icai.org/resource_filel
102531414-1424.pdf.
71.
Id. "Those pronouncements include Accounting Principles Board
(APB) Opinions, FASB Statements, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Audit and Accounting Guides, AICPA Statements of Posi-
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By contrast, IAS 18, in keeping true to accounting standards that are principled in nature, covers revenue recognition in
three broad categories: the sale of goods, the rendering of services,
and the revenue generated from interest, royalties, and dividends."
Unlike GAAP, IFRS does not provide industry specific accounting
guidelines. IFRS does not include guidelines for accounting for
performance of construction type and certain production type contracts 3 or accounting for revenue arrangements with multiple deliverables.74
Accordingly, U.S. GAAP indoctrinates U.S. corporations in
an accounting regime that provides pronouncements, bulletins, and
guidelines for a myriad of cross-industry and revenue recognition
scenarios. If the United States adopted IFRS, U.S. issuers would
move from an accounting system that has a pronouncement, bulletin, interpretation, or guideline for virtually any revenue recognition issue imaginable, to an accounting regime that separates the
complex issue of revenue recognition into three broad categories.75
Old habits can be hard to break, and in spite of the efforts
to convert to the global standards under IFRS, U.S. issuers may be
resistant to the more murky IFRS and its principles-based standards. Once the United States begins to implement IFRS, it is likely that U.S. issuers will continually challenge the principles-based
standards relating to revenue recognition, lobbying both the SEC
and the FASB to provide more interpretive guidance and more industry specific guidance to fit their industry specific or customized
needs. Consequently, the simple principles relating to revenue
recognition under IFRS could eventually mushroom, morph, and
revert back to the very accounting regime from which the United
States is considering severing ties. While these assessments are
tions (SOPs), FASB Interpretations, Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issues
and SEC Staff Accounting Bulletins (SAB) and the like." Id.
72.
See InternationalAccounting Standard 18: Revenue, in IFRS, supra
note 33,
14-33.
73.
See AICPA Statements of Positions (SOP) 81-1.
74. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EMERGING ISSUES TASK
FORCE, REVENUE ARRANGEMENTS WITH MULTIPLE DELIVERIES (2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/abs00-21.pdf.
75. See InternationalAccounting Standard 18: Revenue, in IFRS, supra
note 33,
14, 20, 29.
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speculative, this conclusion is based on the present U.S. financial
reporting culture. Many U.S. issuers are still wary of the accounting scandals of the past, and public company auditors and regulators continue to maintain a heightened vigilance for accounting
scandals, fraud, impropriety, and other disclosure issues. 6 Consequently, absent an appropriate comfort level, those involved with
the accounting and financial reporting processes may be leery
about letting go of the many guideposts and road maps comprising
U.S. GAAP to venture out into the more principles-based and less
detail oriented IFRS regime.
D. Consolidations-U.S.GAAP vs. IFRS
Financial reporting of affiliated entities on a consolidated
basis is another prominent financial reporting area, as this also has
a significant impact on a corporation's balance sheet. The major
sub-issue under this broad consolidation area is accounting for
Special Purpose Entities ("SPEs"). SPEs are legal entities such as
corporations, trusts, or partnerships that are established for a specific or limited purpose. SPEs can be used in a number of different
contexts. One of the more common SPE uses is asset securitizations, a process by which securities are created whose payments
are supported by cash flows generated by a pool of financial assets.77
Generally, a corporation will try to structure transactions to
avoid reporting SPEs on a consolidated basis because of the adverse impact such accounting treatment may have on its financial
statements. Corporations place large debt obligations into SPEs to

76.
See, e.g., Krysten Crawford, Ex-Tyco CEO Kozlowski Found GuiltySecond Trial Ends in Guilty Verdicts for FormerTyco Chief and the Company's
Ex-CFO Swartz, CNN/MoNEY, June 21, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/
17/news/newsmakers/tycojtrialoutcome/ndex.htm; Joseph McCafferty, Adelphia Comes Clean-Can Vanessa Wittman Help Bring Scandal-Wracked Adelphia out of Bankruptcy-and Back into Investor's Good Graces?, CFO.COM,
Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/3011051#; Jake Ulick,
WorldCom's Financial Bomb-From the President on Down, Officials Worried
About Investor Confidence Weigh In, CNN/MONEY, June 26, 2002,
http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/25/news/worldcom/index.htm.
77.
See THE BOND MARKET ASS'N, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
SEC

INDuS.

Ass'N,

SPECIAL

PURPOSE

ENTTIES

(SPEs)

AND

SECuRITIZATION MARKETS 1-2 (2002), availableat http://www.isda.org/

speeches/pdf/SPV-Discussion-Piece-Final-FebOl .pdf.
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avoid reporting those obligations on their own financial statements. 7' Nevertheless, if accounting rules require the corporation
to consolidate the SPE, then the corporation's financials will reflect the debt obligation regardless.79 Corporations then will attempt to structure their SPE transactions to avoid SPE consolidation whenever possible. Subsequently, SPE accounting guidelines
garnered much attention in the United States, as cries for change
resounded. In 2003, the FASB developed Financial Interpretation
46(R) ("FIN 46(R)"), an accounting interpretation that created a
new consolidation model for SPEs. 0 Prior to the FASB's development of FIN 46(R), corporations were required to report affiliated entities on a consolidated basis if the reporting entity held
majority voting control over the affiliated entity."'
FIN 46(R) created a new consolidation model,82 the variable interest model, to broaden the SPE consolidation net to prevent,
among other things, the type of financial engineering that occurred
with Enron. 3 The idea behind the broadened model was to force
companies to report debt-laden SPEs on a consolidated basis if in
fact the reporting entity had exposure to the obligations transacted
through the SPE. 4 FIN 46(R) veered away from consolidation
criteria premised primarily on control. Under FIN 46(R), a company exposed to a majority of another entity's expected losses or
entitled to a majority of an entity's expected residual returns must
78.
As a result of U.S. issuers' failure to report SPE obligations on a
consolidated basis, the FASB developed a new accounting interpretation, Financial Interpretation 46(R). See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION
401(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFFBALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS,
SPECIAL
PURPOSE
ENTITIES,
AND

TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 91 (2003) [hereinafter SPE REPORT],
availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 94-CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY OWNED

SUBSIDIARIES
6-7 (1976), availableat http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop-FAS94
.pdf.
82.
SPE REPORT, supra note 78, at 91.
83.
See generally United States v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 374 F.3d 281
(2004) (explaining how Enron created surrogate companies to engage in offbalance-sheet transactions).
84.
SPE REPORT, supra note 78, at 91.
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report that SPE on a consolidated basis.85 Consolidation under the
variable interest model, therefore, is based on the general notion of
expected benefits or losses inuring to the reporting entity rather
than the more rigid notion of voting control through common stock
ownership. 6
Consolidation under the IFRS accounting regime, by contrast, is based on the broader and less complex idea of control.87
The IFRS corollary related to consolidations is IAS 27: Consolidated and Separate FinancialStatements,88 and its interpretive corollary, SIC Interpretation 12: Consolidation-Special Purpose
Entities ("SIC-12"), which gives specific guidance on consolidation criteria related to SPEs.8 9 IFRS requires consolidation when
the reporting entity has "control" over the investee. 9° The consolidation decision under IFRS operates essentially on a tiered system.
The top tier, majority voting rights, is the most straight forward
indicia of control. 91 From there, the standards and interpretations
work their way down to more tenuous but still tangible indications
of control.
SIC-12 was promulgated to give guidance specifically for
SPE consolidations. 92 SIC-12 requires consolidation if:
(1) The SPE conducts its activities to meet the reporting entity's specific needs so that the reporting
entity obtains benefits from the SPE's operation; 93
(2) The reporting entity has decision-making powers to obtain majority benefits from the SPE's activities; 94
85.
OF

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SIC-12 AND FIN 46R- THE SUBSTANCE
at
available
(2004),
5
CONTROL

http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/23715FBD 1CE619998
0256F9C003614A0/$file/SIC12_FIN46R.pdf.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88.
See IFRS, supra note 33, at 1417.
89.
IFRS, supra note 33, at 2555.
90.
InternationalAccounting Standard 27: Consolidated and Separate
FinancialStatements, in IFRS, supra note 33, 13.
91.
Id.
SIC Interpretation 12: Consolidation-SpecialPurpose Entities, in
92.
IFRS, supra note 33, 110(a).
Id.
93.
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(3) The reporting entity is able to obtain the majority of the SPE's benefits through an "auto-pilot" mechanism; 9
(4) By having a right to the majority of the SPE's
benefits, the reporting entity is exposed to the SPE's
business risks incident to the SPE's activities; 96 and
(5) The reporting entity retains a majority residual
or ownership risk related to the SPE or its assets to
obtain benefits from the SPE's activities.97
Again, if any one of these criteria is present under IFRS accounting
standards, IFRS will require the reporting entity to report the SPE
on a consolidated basis.
Under the more principles-based IFRS standards, the issuer
must apply much more judgment regarding the decision whether to
consolidate a particular set of SPEs. The concern then, is how U.S.
issuers will handle this more judgment-oriented principles-based
approach, especially in light of the U.S. issuer's strong propensity
to avoid reporting SPEs on a consolidated basis if there is possible
interpretive wriggle room.
1. Applying the Consolidation Guidance-IFRS vs. U.S. GAAP
Although the IFRS guidance related to consolidations is
still relatively new, the SEC is gaining insight as to how the implementation of consolidation guidance works under IFRS versus
U.S. GAAP. Accounting representatives on behalf of various constituencies spoke at an SEC roundtable discussion held on August
4, 2008 ("the Roundtable"). 98 It was at the Roundtable that representatives discussed their companies' experiences in trying to account for a set of transactions under IFRS that they had previously
accounted for under U.S. GAAP. The results were telling.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. I 10(b).
Id. I 10(c).

97.

Id. I 10(d).

98.
Policy & Practice-InternationalConvergence-ConsolidationDecisions Are Proving Difficult Under GAAP and IFRS, SEC Panelists Say, 4 BNA
TAX & ACCOUNTING 16 (2008).
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The German financial institution, Deutsche Bank AG
("Deutsche Bank") gave their account of the issues they encountered in converting from U.S. GAAP to IFRS. 99 Charlotte Jones,
managing director and global head of the accounting policy group
at Deutsche Bank, pointed out that her company's shift to IFRS
"required much more work and analysis in deciding what to derecognize or consolidate back on the balance sheet when analyzing
Ms. Jones revealed that Deutsche
asset-backed securities. '
Bank's shift to IFRS required the Bank to consolidate some 200
entities that previously did not require consolidation under U.S.
GAAP. Ms. Jones discussed the added dimensions to Deutsche
Bank's decision-making process when they were asked to consider
their SPE transactions under IFRS. I° Ms. Jones explained that
"the use of IFRS required Deutsche Bank to 'step back, look at the
entity in its entirety [and] look at the assets and liability arrangements within them."' 2 Ms. Jones noted that IFRS "required a
much more holistic, better understanding of the risks and benefits
[of the investment vehicles] and the bank's relationship with
them." She explained that "reliance on IFRS guidance in assessing
SPEs and consolidation issues around them created more work, in
that you could never rely on any specific rules to give you a 'yes'
or 'no' answer unlike some aspects of U.S. GAAP."'' 3 Ms. Jones
further explained Deutsche Bank's need to understand fully the4
nature of the assets and liabilities being transferred to the SPEs.'0
Ms. Jones noted, however, that even though accounting for the
transactions under IFRS was more difficult than accounting for the
same transactions under U.S. GAAP, she felt that reporting under
IFRS did a better job of capturing the economic substance of the
relationship between Deutsche Bank and its affiliated SPEs. Ms.
Jones also noted that because IFRS was less mature than GAAP,
there was "less of a track record" to reference for guidance. She
noted how that circumstance necessitated Deutsche Bank's need to
Marcy, supra note 20. Germany, along with the other sovereign na99.
tions comprising the European Union, converted from U.S. GAAP to IFRS in
2005. See Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: Dependence Despite Independence, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 275, 306 (2008).
Marcy, supra note 19.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
104.
Id.
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exercise judgment which made the SPE consolidation decision
more difficult under IFRS.10 5
2. Foreseeable Challenges for U.S. Issuers
Although Deutsche Bank's experience in converting from
U.S. GAAP to IFRS is a localized example consisting of just one
institution, from this example one can draw inferences and make
general assessments regarding foreseeable challenges for U.S. issuers. In their process of converting from U.S. GAAP to IFRS,
IFRS required Deutsche Bank to bring some 200 entities back onto
its balance sheet.'0° Although Ms. Jones did not quantify this consolidation effort's financial impact on Deutsche Bank's balance
sheet, it is reasonable to infer that the dollar amount was significant. The next step then is to speculate what U.S. issuers' experiences might be with a similar consolidation issue when they are
asked to interpret and apply IFRS to that transaction. How will the
judgment oriented consolidation analysis required under IFRS
square with a U.S. corporate culture that, among other things, is
sensitive to transactions that may have an adverse affect on U.S.
issuer balance sheets?
Accordingly, the first "implementation challenge" with
U.S. issuers adopting IFRS will be to overcome the present paradigm that permeates U.S. issuers and their approach to financial
reporting. The present paradigm is a financial reporting culture
whose focus is not on capturing a transaction's economic substance, but instead, is focused on presenting financial information
in as favorable a light as possible while staying within GAAP's
prescriptive guidelines.1°7 U.S. issuers are sensitive to how certain
transactions are going to affect their financials and are ever leery
of shareholder action to bad financial news. Such concerns can be
a backdrop for the U.S. issuer's approach to every consolidation
decision.
The most extreme example of this U.S. issuer sensitivity is
Enron's use of SPEs to create fictitious revenues and hide millions
of dollars worth of debt. Enron, among other reasons, engaged in
their creative (though fraudulent) SPE use to meet a two-fold need:
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Bratton, supra note 27, at 10.
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(i) its need for cash, and (ii) its need to maintain an investment
grade credit rating.08 Enron was reluctant to issue additional equity shares in the company, fearing such actions would create adverse effects on its stock price."° Enron's creative use of the SPE
was their chosen alternative. However, there are other lesspronounced instances in which U.S. issuers have either pushed the
financial reporting envelope or structured a potential consolidating
transaction in a manner to avoid consolidation. "0
In sum, the concern is whether the U.S. issuer has the proper mind set to apply the more principles-based standards under
IFRS in the manner that such standards contemplate. IFRS accounting standards are premised on the basis that individuals will
apply such standards with the goal and intent of engaging in financial reporting that captures the "economic substance" of those
transactions.'
At this juncture, that assumption is premature.
U.S. issuers have demonstrated historically that their intent is not
necessarily to get the numbers "right" but to present their company's financial position as favorably as possible without running
afoul of the accounting guidance in that particular area."' The voluminous amount of accounting literature that now comprises U.S.
GAAP results from this dynamic. GAAP's rules oriented nature is
merely the by-product of U.S. issuer demand for accounting standards with clear bright lines that delineate "safe" from "now

108.
See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., et al., Debtors, 349 B.R. 115, No. 01-16034, (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003) 2003 WL 22048179. As a result of Enron's failure to
report the debt obligations contained in the SPEs that they created, Enron's debt
obligations as of December 31, 2001 were under reported by $11.9 billion. Id.
109.
Id.
110. See NOMURA, OFF-BALANCE SHEET UPDATE (2003), available at
http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/OffBalance SheetUpdateMarch_2003
.pdf (discussing the effects of U.S. Issuers adopting FIN 46 and how corporations are investigating potential strategies for avoiding consolidation under FIN

46).
111. See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 28.
112.
See SOX REPORT, supra note 24, § I.C. (noting how the rules-based
standards under GAAP provided issuers with a roadmap to avoidance of the
accounting objectives inherent in the rules-based GAAP standards). The SOX
REPORT tasked the SEC to explore the viability of a revised accounting regime;
one that interestingly would have been similar to IFRS. Id.
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you've gone too far.""' 3 Accordingly, the problem with trying to
integrate MFRS is that the integration would have to go against the
grain of these entrenched practices. Simply introducing a different
type of accounting regime will not change that situation.
3.

The Auditor's Perspective

At the Roundtable, Kenneth Marshall, the Americas IFRS
leader for Ernst & Young," 4 set forth an auditor's perspective on
the difficulties in applying IAS-27 and SIC-12. Mr. Marshall lamented about the difficulties issuers face under IFRS in determining who ultimately controls a particular SPE. Mr. Marshall noted
that different issuers will have a different perspective on what constitutes control-the implication being that issuers could come to
different consolidation decisions for similar transactions. Mr.
Marshall then suggested that more principled guidance should be
given on how to assess the rewards and risks potential under SIC12." 5 Trevor Harris, the managing chairman and vice chairman at
Morgan Stanley took issue with Mr. Marshall's comments and observations and expressed his view that efforts to obtain more guidance on applying IAS-27 and SIC-12 were "perturbing."' 6 As he
explained, calling for more implementation guidance was, in essence, a push for more "bright lines" that will remove the focus on
the likelihood of an asset or liability deterioration, which would be
a major determinant on when to force an SPE back onto a balance
sheet."7

113.
See Bratton, supra note 27, at 28 (discussing the dynamic between the
public accountant performing the audit and the client being audited wherein the
client will challenge a particular accounting treatment with the assertion "Show
me where it says I can't do this").
114.
Ernst & Young is one of the four remaining international public accounting firms that typically perform the required audits on the larger U.S. corporations and the larger companies around the world. See SmartPros.com, Big
Four Auditing Firms, http://accounting.smartpros.com/x56225.xml (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009) (noting that the global "Big Four Auditing Firms" handle the vast
majority of audits for publicly traded companies and private companies worldwide). The website lists PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu,
Ernst & Young, and KPMG as comprising the "Big Four." Id.
115.
See Marcy, supra note 19.
116.
Marcy, supra note 19.
117.
Id.

2009 The U.S. Move to InternationalAccounting Standards

861

The dialogue between Mr. Marshall and Mr. Harris is but a
harbinger of the problems that loom when U.S. issuers attempt to
phase in and apply the tenants of IFRS. Inevitably, situations will
arise where the U.S. issuer will have to apply IFRS's consolidation
standards to a set of transactions necessitating a tremendous
amount of judgment to determine the appropriate accounting
treatment. From the Roundtable discussion, one can foresee how
the U.S. issuer dealing in the gray areas that underlie IFRS might
push for black and white standards.
IV. THE U.S. FINANCIAL

REPORTING CULTUREPIERCING TO ITS ORIGINS

It is clear that U.S. conversion to IFRS will be difficult, but
the tougher proposition is articulating why such a transition will be
so difficult. When scholars, policy-makers, and standard setters
attempt to address an issue steeped in regulations, rules, pronouncements, and guidelines, the challenge in addressing and ultimately solving the problem is to zero in on the actual problem instead of continuing to be distracted by the symptoms.
A national economy and, to an even greater extent, a global
economy consist of a myriad of commingled, interconnected parts,
which co-exist in symbiotic relationships. An economy in its most
basic form has providers of goods and services and users of goods
and services. Individuals participate exclusively and collectively
in this dynamic, acting at various points in time as either providers
or users of these goods and services. At its core level, there is an
interdependency and connectedness in this global economy that all
participants share.
Viewing a corporation as a hierarchy, the executives sit
atop the pyramid with the task of overseeing the proper execution
of the corporation's strategic vision. The other major constituency,
which can perhaps be seen as the opposing dynamic, are the corporation's shareholders. In theory, these two factions have the same
objective: profit maximization for the corporation. If the corporation experiences general success, then these two individual factions
will usually get along.
In practice, however, the relationship between shareholders
and executives can be tense, with each faction pulling in opposite
directions. In the broadest sense, the shareholders are the collective owners of the corporation who elect the corporation's board of
directors. The board of directors hires or appoints a cadre of ex-
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ecutives who will set and execute that corporation's strategic plan.
Consequently, the shareholders' success is contingent upon the
executives' ability to and success in setting and executing a strategic business plan that is profitable. In theory, this is a
straightforward concept which should produce positive and mutually beneficial results for both constituencies. But when the dynamic plays itself out in actual form, a number of "tensions" develop. It is these "tensions" that result in the morphing of a corporate culture and its corresponding accounting regime which has a
propensity toward complex accounting standards steeped in brightline rules and tests occurring whenever and wherever possible.
A.

"Checks and Incentives"for the Executives-Hammers and
Nails forthe Shareholder

Posit a hypothetical corporation to examine the relationship
between shareholders and executives. The corporation's objective
is to operate at a profit maximizing level where the executives and
the rank and file are collectively pooling their time, talent, and resources to make the corporation profitable. The problem with this
situation is that the shareholder, who has a vested interest in the
corporation's profit maximizing activities, has limited involvement
in the corporation's day-to-day operations and, in essence, has the
opportunity to wield his rights as a shareholder in only a limited set
of circumstances. "8 At the same time, shareholders can and do
have a major impact on and have a significant influence over the
corporation in general, and over the executive officers in particular. The relationship works through two basic functions: the use of
incentive based compensation and the influence that shareholders
wield over that corporation's share value.

118.
As a general matter, shareholders of publicly held corporations exercise their voting power in only a limited set of circumstances: (1) to elect the
corporation's board of directors; see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.03, 8.40; (2)
to approve fundamental corporate changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or
sales of substantially all the corporation's assets; see id. §11.04; (3) to approve
the board of directors' proposal to dissolve the corporation. See id. §14.02. All
other activities and powers are vested in the Corporation's board of directors and
executive officers. See id. §§ 8.01, 8.41.
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B. Executive Compensation:Incentive-Based Compensation

Executive compensation in the United States has been a
source of great controversy as of late."19 The controversy became
even more prominent in light of the financial institutions that fell
into dire straits in the latter part of 2008 requiring government rescue to the tune of unprecedented billions.2
A component of executive compensation is "incentivebased compensation." Incentive-based compensation is compensation that a corporation pays to an executive over and above his
base salary.' This portion of the executive's compensation is contingent upon the executive meeting some pre-determined perfor22
mance mark in areas such as revenue, income, market share, etc.
The most popular form of incentive-based compensation
is incen2
1
options.
stock
of
form
the
in
tive-based compensation

119.
The controversy primarily stems from the ever growing pay disparity
between corporate CEOs and their rank and file employees. See Meredith R.
Conway, Money for Nothing and Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 384 (2008) ("In 1980, the average
CEO made 42 times the average hourly worker's pay."). That number ballooned
to 525 times the average hourly worker's salary by the year 2000. See id.
120. See Matthew Karnitschnig, et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 2008, at Al.
121.

See The HOME DEPOT, PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE OF 2008

ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 27 (2008), available at http://sec.edgaronline.com/home-depot-inc/def- 14a-proxy-statementdefmitive/2008/04/1 1/
Section 1.aspx. For fiscal year 2007,
70% of annual incentive compensation for [Home Depot's]
named executive officers was tied to Company financial performance, including achievement of pre-established sales and
operating profit objectives as set forth in [Home Depot's]
business plan for the fiscal year .... A significant portion of
equity compensation for [Home Depot's] named executive officers for Fiscal year 2007 was . . . conditioned on the
achievement of specified levels of shareholder return relative
to other S&P 500 companies.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
See id. ("[E]quity compensation [for Home Depot's CEO] for Fiscal
year 2007 was delivered solely in the form of performance shares and performance-vested stock options that [could] be exercised only upon attainment of
positive share-priced performance of 25% or more from the grant date.").
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Stock options, in their most basic form, work as follows.
On a specific date, the grant date, a corporation will grant a corporate employee the option to purchase stock at a future point in
time." ' The most straightforward grant execution method 2 ' gives
the executive the right to purchase a pre-determined number of
corporate shares in the future at the stock's value on the date the
corporation grants the stock option. 6 The philosophy behind this
type of incentive-based stock option is that the corporate employee, usually an executive, now has a long-term vested interest
in the company. Accordingly, the corporate employee will marshal his time, talent, and abilities to make that company as profitable and successful
as possible to increase the value of his stock
7
options. 11
Incentive-based compensation in the form of stock options
then, in theory, is a means of aligning company, executive, and
shareholder fortunes. This proposition is based on the underlying
assumption that the executive will endeavor to maximize the value
of his stock options through no other means but the marshaling of
his time, skill, and talents. This, however, is an assumption that is
often flawed.
Without chronicling in great detail how this phenomena
played out in various U.S. corporations, 28 the problem with
incentive-based compensation is that it fails to consider man's inability to do the right thing if he has to do so at personal sacrifice to
himself, specifically those instances in which a corporation experiences declining revenue, declining profits, declining market
share, or otherwise recessionary economic conditions, and the executive must decide how to "navigate" these matters through the
financial statement reporting process. The decision the executive
faces is a difficult one. The executive may choose either option
(a): report this poor financial performance accurately and risk suf124.
125.

See id. at 31.
The actual grant execution can work in a number of different ways.

See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 123-ACcOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED
COMPENSATION,

at FAS 123-2, available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop

_FAS 123.pdf.
126.
See THE HOME DEPOT, supra note 121, at 27.
127.
See id.
128.
See generally Neal Newman, The "Carrot" Approach to Accounting
StandardSetting, 16 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 227 (2008).
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fering the almost certain adverse affect the information will have
on the corporation's share price and value of his stock options; or
option (b): engage in the practice of "financial engineering," '29 or
in some cases commit outright financial fraud to avoid the consequences that stem from bad news reported in the financials. It
would be hard to determine the percentage of executives who
choose option (a) versus option (b). Even so, one need only take a
cursory glance at any publication that tracks SEC enforcement actions related to accounting and financial reporting to appreciate the
fact that executives are still engaging in both "financial engineering" or outright accounting fraud at significant levels.
C. The FinancialStatements-The Connecting Link Between
Shareholdersand Executives
Corporate executives and shareholders both have a vested
interest in the information depicted in its financial statements as
that information directly impacts how the market values that company's worth. This interconnected dynamic creates a financial
reporting game with high stakes that ties fortunes collectively to
the same set of information.
Accordingly, Accounting Standard Setters and Financial
Gatekeepers need to manage the dynamic between executives and
their financial statement preparation. Shareholders premise their
buy and sell decisions upon sound financial reporting and need to
know that the information depicted in a corporation's financial
statements is a fair representation of the corporation's financial
condition. The problem with the current arrangement is that
shareholders are mere bystanders in the financial reporting process.
Their share purchase is merely their admission ticket to participate
passively in the corporation's success. The necessary watchful eye
is the U.S. regulatory regime with the SEC as the central enforcing
agency. 3° The relationship between shareholder and executive can
129.
"Financial engineering" occurs when a corporation engages in accounting practices for the sole purpose of achieving accounting results that are
not grounded in economic substance. See Bala G. Dharan, FinancialEngineering with Special Purpose Entities, in ENRON AND BEYOND: TECHINICAL
ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES ISSUES

103, 108-12 (Julia K. Brazelton & Janice C. Ammons eds., 2002) (discussing
the use of special purpose entities as financial engineering tools).
130. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
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be a contentious one, with the SEC in essence being the intermediary who manages this relationship as effectively as it can using
the rules based accounting standards drafted under U.S. GAAP.
D. The U.S. FinancialReporting Culture's Effect on Accounting
Standardsand Public Company Regulation
When corporate executives have the distorted incentive to
engage in either financial engineering or outright accounting fraud,
the counter measure to alleviate this situation is to draft accounting
standards "defensively," that is, draft the standards in such a way
to clearly delineate the line distinguishing between "right" and
"wrong." In fact, the current state of U.S. GAAP is a direct result
of the "push the envelope" financial reporting culture where the
U.S. preparer asks, "How far can I go without going too far?" Accordingly, the sheer momentum of this "push the envelope" regime, in essence, forces standard setters to draw clear lines of demarcation in the accounting sands. The result is a set of accounting standards replete with quantified rules and bright line tests that
give the U.S. issuer boundaries.
This whole discussion may beg the questions, "So what?
As long as the U.S. issuer reports within the confines of the rules,
how is that a problem?" The problem is that in this type of financial reporting and regulatory environment, U.S. corporate culture
blurred the big picture of presenting financial statements that are
fair economic representations of their respective corporations. Instead, the focus is not necessarily on getting the financial statements right, but on presenting those financial statements as favorably as possible while staying within the accounting standard's confines. This attitude often results in financial statements that are
technically correct, but not fair economic depictions of the corporation. Thus, regulators and enforcers often draft accounting standards defensively and engage in heavy-handed enforcement practices as countermeasures to the corporation created problem of incentivizing aggressive accounting and financial reporting. 3 ' FinalFormation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 1,
2009). The Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC in response to the stock
market crash of 1929. Id. The stock market crash of 1929 prompted a need for
more oversight of publicly traded companies so that corporate dissemination of
financial information was a more formalized and regimented process. Id.
131.
See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Causey, Cr. No. H-0425
(S-2)
(S.D.
Tex.
2004),
available
at
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ly, there is the added pressure of the U.S. corporate shareholder
who tends to be myopic in nature and will show little patience for
and upward trending financial
corporations that
3 2 fail to show steady
performance.

It is the converging of these dynamics that has created a
U.S. corporate culture that seems particularly unsuited for the more
principles-based accounting regime that comprises IFRS. Consequently, before U.S. corporations can fully embrace and assimilate
the less-structured accounting regime of IFRS, the United States
must first address these forces that necessarily resist a principlesbased regime.
E. The Differences Between ComparableIFRS Provinces
and the United States
Prior to implementing IFRS, the United States should take
a closer look at provinces that have already adopted IFRS, even
though such an exercise may force the United States to ask the
tough questions. Is IFRS an accounting regime that is compatible
with the U.S. financial reporting culture or should the United
States revisit the decision to adopt such a regime? The Obama administration, through its SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, seems to
be taking the right step in asking these questions.'33
1. The European Union
To date, over 100 countries, including countries as large
Germany and as small as Anguilla, have adopted some form
IFRS as promulgated by the IASB.m The largest contingency
IFRS adopters is the European Union ("EU"), which consists

as
of
of
of

http://fll .findlaw.comnews.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usvlay707O4ind.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (alleging Kenneth Lay, Enron's former CEO and
Board Chairman, received approximately $300 million from the sale of Enron
stock options and restricted stock between 1998 and 2001, netting over $217
million in profit). During that same period, Jeffrey Skilling, Kenneth Lay's
successor received approximately $200 million from the sale of Enron stock
options and restricted stock, netting over $89 million in profit. Id.
132. See James Niccolai, Sun CEO Fends Off Angry Shareholders,
ITWoRLD, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.itworld.com/business/57278/sun-ceofends-angry-shareholders.
133. Marcy, supra note 19.
134. See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Use of IFRS by Jurisdiction,
http:llwww.iasplus.comlcountry/useias.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
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some twenty-seven sovereign nations since its defacto inception in
195 1 3' The EU accounts for some $11 trillion or twenty-six percent of global
market capitalization when combined with Australia
36
1
Israel.
and
In 2005, the EU instituted mandatory IFRS adoption for its
member states, requiring more than 7,000 companies within the
EU to prepare their financial statements in accordance with
IFRS.'37 EU member Germany, with a population of approximately 82 million 3 ' and an equity market counted as among the largest
in the world, 139 is a good comparison point for the United States.
2. The United States vs. Germany-Different Demographics
Business capital sources in the United States are different
from Germany. This variance in investor demographic alone can
create a different emphasis, attitude, and approach in accounting
standard setting and financial reporting. A small number of large
banks and pension funds comprise the primary shareholder base
for German corporations, therefore, corporate ownership and
° voting rights are concentrated among these larger institutions.'4
By contrast, the capital sources in the United States are
much more diffuse. Business capital sources in the United States
draw upon large institutional clients such as mutual funds, pension
funds, and insurance companies, as well as small retail and individual investors. Individual investors are presumably less sophisticated, and have less informal access to management, but nonethe4
less comprise a significant portion of U.S. capital investment.
If the bulk of a country's investment base is large banks
and pension funds, as in the case of Germany, the need for a sophisticated, investor-oriented financial reporting system is less
135.
See Fleckner, supra note 99, at 287.
136. IFRS Roadmap, supra note 2, at 70,819.
137.
See Fleckner, supra note 99, at 287.
138.
At the end of 2004, Germany's population was 82.5 million. GermanCulture.com, German Population, http://www.germanculture.com.ual
library/facts/bl-population.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
139. Carol A. Frost & Kurt P. Ramin, InternationalAuditing Differences,
181 J. ACCT. 62, 62 (1996).
140. Id.
141.
GERHARD G. MUELLER, ET AL., ACCOUNTING: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 4 (4th ed. 1996).
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pressing. Pension fund managers and banks can satisfy their need
for corporate information in a straightforward fashion as they typically will have direct access to corporate management through personal contacts and direct visits. 14 2 In contrast, the United States,
with a large diffuse investor base that includes both institutional
and retail investors, requires a more "paternal" or protective approach to financial reporting and regulation. 143 Without such protections, the individual investor would have two choices: disengage from capital market investing or invest in a market with a less
rigid regulatory net and risk falling through the cracks.
Naturally then, it does not make sense to marginalize U.S.
corporations from an investment source comprising billions in equity market participants.'" Accordingly, U.S. corporate culture in
part guides accounting standard setters and regulators to serve the
demographic comprising the U.S. capital investor. This results in a
more prescriptive rules-based financial reporting regime on the
standard setting and regulatory sides. The standard setting side
includes bright line tests and quantified thresholds. On the regulatory side, regulators employ a more formalistic, detailed and
heavy-handed approach in enforcing accounting standards and
mete out severe punishment when transgressors breach such standards.
3. Auditing Standards
Other noteworthy differences between the United States
and Germany highlight possible challenges to a U.S. conversion to
IEFRS. For example, German auditors have less liability exposure
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
See Lyn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REv.
144.
407,430-31 (2002) ("Individual investors, most of whom hold rather small portfolios, own nearly 50 percent of all U.S. corporate equities.").
Although institutions like mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies own most of the rest, often these institutions' investment decisions also are influenced by individuals'
views of the market: it makes little difference if a mutual fund
manager thinks her equity fund a good investment, if individual investors do not agree.
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as Germany has placed caps on damages that may be levied against
auditors for negligence. Likewise, the German corporation and
their auditors will limit potential liability for all other accounting
services by drafting those limitations into their contractual agreements. '45 A lower level of legal exposure for the auditor creates a
more relaxed auditing environment. With less at stake in terms of
potential liability, the auditor can likewise relax the rules regarding
what is "right" and what is "wrong." A more principles-based accounting regime is more compatible in an environment where the
concerns for investor protection are not as high. Lower concern
for investor protection coupled with lowered potential liability for
the gatekeepers involved in the process creates an environment
more compatible to operating in a less prescriptive accounting regime like IFRS.
4. General Business Protocol
Finally, dynamic differences between U.S. and German
general business protocol may perhaps lend insight to the foreseeable problematic implementation of IFRS in the United States. A
common unifier among people around the world is the fact that we
are of one race, the human race. Humans have the same basic
needs for food, clothing, shelter, and some type of family unit from
which we can draw love and support. However, many cultural
differences pervade the human race, and these differences can
permeate the simplest things from how we greet each other in the
morning to how we view business relationships.
Human dynamics as they may vary in different provinces
can also affect cultural and legal norms. For example, the Japanese tend to view business relationships as an extension of, or on a
par with, personal and family relationships.' 46 In other words,
doing business in these cultures is not just about an arm's length
transaction between two parties that may be mutually beneficial.
In these cultures, doing business is the result of nurtured and cultivated relationships. Consequently, business people in Japanese
145.
See Frost & Ramin, supra note 139 (noting that auditors' legal risk in
Germany appears to be growing as evidenced by an increase in publicized audit
failures).
146.
See JON P. ALSTON & ASAO TAKEI, JAPANESE BUSINESS CULTURE
AND PRACTICES: A GUIDE TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JAPANESE BUSINESS

PRACTICES 105-06 (2005).
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culture spend a lot of time cultivating interpersonal relationships
before considering any actual business transaction.1 47 In the United
States, by contrast, business people generally treat business transactions in more of an arm's length fashion, placing less emphasis
on the relationship between the two parties and more 4emphasis on
itself.' 1
the mutually beneficial nature of the transaction
Similarly, differences in the business relationship between
the German issuer and its public auditor versus the U.S. issuer and
its public auditor illustrate why a more principles-based accounting
regime might be unsuitable for the United States. In Germany, the
audit managers tend to be involved with clients over a number of
years because German corporations favor consistency in audit personnel.1 49 German management considers audit staff changes from
year to year as low quality service.'5 ° U.S. managers on the other
hand are less concerned with who does the audit but rather how
efficient and cost effective are the auditors in completing their
task. Therefore, U.S. companies are less concerned with staff
as long as the job is completed on time and under budgturnover
15 1
et.
One can then appreciate that these dynamics will affect the
German auditor's approach in conducting an audit. For example,
German audit managers might consider it inappropriate for auditors to question management's oral statements.5 2 German management may interpret the auditor's inquiries as the auditor questioning the corporation's integrity and ethical practices, a clear
affront or a taboo in Germany.153 In contrast, the U.S. auditing
firms train their auditors to question management's oral representaThe U.S. manager would not take offense to such questions.

147.

Id.

Id. at 106.
148.
Frost & Ramin, supra note 139, at 63.
149.
Id.
150.
See generally James L. Craig, Jr., The Business of Public Accounting,
151.
CPA J., Aug. 1994, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/15702999.htm (discussing the business of public accounting, business professionals' need to reduce staff, be efficient, and the need to maximize staff productivity).
Frost & Ramin, supra note 142, at 66.
152.
Id.
153.
See Sample Audit Interview Introduction and Questions,
154.
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/205/images/p36.pdf (last visited Apr.
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tioning, as he or she would likely view the questioning as the auditor simply doing his job.
V. IFRS - IMPLEMENTATION-TRYING
A.

TO FIX THE PROBLEMS

The "Usual Suspects"

What needs to happen in order for the U.S. conversion from
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to International Financial
Reporting
Standards
to be
a
smooth transition/implementation? It is here that one must distinguish between
actions that address the core of the matter versus actions that only
treat the symptoms. One can cull through a great deal of scholarship regarding this topic and note the "usual suspects" as issues to
address for successful IFRS implementation, a few of which are
worth mentioning. To be clear, however, these items are mentioned merely to make the point that addressing these issues still
does not address what is at the core of the U.S. corporate culture
that may be a fundamental barrier to the United States' successful
implementation of IFRS.
1. The U.S. Regulatory Environment
The SEC has been under fire as of late for its failure to ferret out monumental frauds such as the recent scandal involving
Bernard Madoff's perpetuation of a $50 billion ponzi scheme
through his investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC.' 55 Nonetheless, the United States, through the SEC,
is considered one of the more "heavy handed" financial reporting
enforcers in the world. 156 Indeed, the United States passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which required additional overlays of

1, 2009) (including examples of specific training for auditors regarding how the
auditor should question management to gather information concerning fraud).
155.

See generally Richard Hill, House Subcommittee Will Probe Madoff

Affair; Full Hearing Urged by Minority, SEC. L. DAILY, Dec. 18, 2008.

156.
See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 192 ("Various well-publicized,
bipartisan blue-ribbon committee reports have criticized U.S. securities regulation for being unduly cumbersome, and in part, blamed overregulation for a loss
of competitiveness in the global capital marketplace.").
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corporate accounting and financial reporting compliance.'57 Following the Sarbanes Oxley Act's enactment, many smaller companies had to forego the public capital markets less they be crushed
by Sarbanes' added regulatory burdens. 58
'"
The SEC will have to temper its basis for enforcement actions under a new principles-based accounting regime, whereas a
rules-based regime may have more clearly delineated the lines regarding "right" and "wrong" financial reporting. Such previously
clear lines will likely blur when the SEC works with financial reporting under IFRS. Accordingly, regulators and enforcers will
facilitate a smoother U.S. transition to IFRS if they recalibrate their
enforcement regime to allow for more flexibility and a range of
possible outcomes, that is, recalibrate what is a "reasonable rate of
speed given the present conditions."'59
2. Auditor Liability
Ensuring an easier transition from U.S. GAAP to IFRS requires the United States to adjust present auditor liability to account for IFRS's less prescriptive regime. The United States
needs to revisit the whole paradigm of circumstances that result in
auditor liability, including the notion of "material misstatements"
or "material omissions," prior to adopting an accounting regime in
which there will conceivably be more than one "right" answer. A
new approach should revolve around the auditor's diligence in
making sure that the issuer in question made appropriate efforts to
record transactions within the principles-based guidelines set forth
under IFRS.
3. U.S. Financial Statement Preparers
U.S. corporations are perhaps the most prominent players
integral to the success of IFRS. Even though the SEC regulates
157.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 §§ 101-09,
401-09, 116 Stat. 745, 800-10 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.A. (2004)).
158.
Sarah Johnson, Sarbox Getting Costlier for Small Firms-A New
Survey from Merrill Lynch Adds Fuel to the Firefor a Sarbox Rollback, CFO,
Dec. 5, 2006, http://www.cfo.comlarticle.cfmi8376091/c_3666324/?f=archives
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
159.
See discussion infra Part II.
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financial reporting and the public accountants are on the front lines
of this regulatory process, financial statements are ultimately management's responsibility. Correspondingly, U.S. issuers will have
to be the driving force behind the implementation of IFRS in order
for the new accounting regime to succeed.
B. Something Different-Incentives to get it Right
The United States must address one fundamental core variable in order to create a financial reporting environment receptive
to an accounting regime like IFRS. That fundamental variable is
the U.S. issuers' mind-set in their approach toward accounting and
financial reporting. Principles-based accounting is premised on
giving corporate managers the latitude to insure that they capture
the "economic substance" of a transaction. Then, one must recognize and appreciate the underlying assumption built into the principles-based regime: managers will focus their efforts on getting
the numbers "right" versus mere compliance with bright-line tests
of form.
1. At the Core
Academics have the luxury' 6° to sit and contemplate that
which is wrong in the world and then to posit some supposition as
to how to remedy such ills. Though there may be some truth to the
adage "every problem has a solution," that solution, whatever it
may be, can prove elusive. Another luxury that the academic position affords is the luxury of outside the box thinking, or more accurately, thinking that is not always tethered by what may or may not
be viable or practical. If academics fail to push unconventional
thinking in the incubated environment of academic scholarship,
then we have failed to utilize this platform to its fullest potential.
These prefatory comments are included in an effort to adjust the
reader's mind-set and open receptivity to an approach that is both
unorthodox and cuts sharply against the grain of current business
protocol.
2. Incentivizing Accurate Financial Reporting
Presently U.S. issuers in the financial statement preparation
process have distorted incentives to financial statement presenta160.

In fact, it is a precept of our station.
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tion. When U.S. issuers prepare their quarterly and annual financial statements, the focus is not necessarily on getting the numbers
"right," but on presenting the financial position of that company as
favorably as possible without deviating from the prescriptive parameters set out under U.S. GAAP. The added variable of incentive based compensation in the form of stock options is an additional dynamic that can improperly distort the issuers' proper focus
on financial reporting. Poor financial performance results in a corresponding decrease in market capitalization which, in turn, results
in reduced stock option values. It necessarily follows that those
who control the financial reporting process will have incentives to
distort financial information to avoid the adverse impact that poor
financial performance would have on their personal financial
stakes when faced with tough financial reporting choices. 6 ' The
present incentive-based practices effectively create a "disincentive" for reporting poor information accurately. The challenge
then is to change this dynamic and create a paradigm where the
executive/ financial statement preparer's focus remains on reporting financial information accurately regardless of whether that
information happens to be favorable or unfavorable.
Consider then the following alternative to incentive based
compensation. Instead of attempting to incentivize executive performance based on stock options, consider the practice of incentivizing accurate financial reporting. In other words, base a portion
of an executive's compensation on the extent to which his corporation's financial statements fairly present the financial position of
his respective company. Consider the reverberating effects that
such an action would have. This proposition envisions executives
and financial statement preparers with a completely different
mindset when engaging in the financial preparation and reporting
process. Incentivizing accurate financial reporting would shift the
financial statement preparer's focus from "pushing the numbers"
as favorably as possible without stepping outside the bounds of
GAAP, to reporting the numbers accurately, regardless of whether
that information was favorable or unfavorable. By giving the fi161.
Review of some high profile accounting scandals reveals that at the
core of the scandal were self-serving choices by those operating at the corporation's executive levels or those who held positions as controlling shareholders.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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nancial statement preparer a stake in quality financial reporting, it
is more likely that the financial statements will be a better representation of that company's financial position.
3. Conception to Adoption
The unusual and perhaps novel aspect of this proposal is
that it does not suggest different laws, better laws, more restrictive
laws, etc. This is an idea rooted in harnessing man's natural tendencies to act in his own self-interest and then channeling this character trait toward producing a desired result. Given that this proposal is not one that is rooted in law, incentivizing accurate financial reporting thus requires a voluntary buy in from all the constituencies involved in the financial reporting process. Corporate
boards that oversee and structure executive compensation packages
would have to embrace such an approach and then structure executive compensation accordingly.
Additionally, the percentage of executive income apportioned to accurate financial reporting would have to be substantial
enough to motivate the executive/financial statement preparer to
engage in the desired behavior and fully embrace the concept of
accurate financial reporting. If this mark were to be quantified,
fifteen to twenty-five percent of an executive's salary would seem
adequate while at the same time giving corporations and their
board's flexibility and latitude in pegging the right percentage for
their particular institution.
C. The Resulting Effect on IFRS Implementation
Incentivizing accurate financial reporting could be the
change that accomplishes the ultimate goal of creating a dynamic
within the U.S. financial reporting regime that makes it more suitable for IFRS reporting standards. By incentivizing accurate financial reporting, the "push the envelope" reporting practices that
exist presently would be removed because the executive's incentives would shift from presenting the financial information as favorably as possible to presenting such information accurately.
This change in focus would facilitate greater receptiveness for
IFRS standards because U.S. preparers would focus towards capturing the economic substance of a transaction whether that substance is positive or negative.
The reduced pressure on financial statement preparation
would trickle down into the enforcement and regulatory environ-
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ments as well. Presently, the relationships in the financial reporting process can be characterized as adversarial at best. On one
side of the financial reporting process are the accounting standard
setters and regulators. The standard setters draft prescriptive rulesbased accounting standards to create clearly delineated lines of
right and wrong. Likewise, the regulatory enforcers adopt a heavyhanded approach to enforcement in order to create a deterrent effect on both "financial engineering" and the more deviant behavior
of accounting fraud. On the other side are the U.S. issuers, the
ones ultimately responsible for the information that goes into their
financial statements. Their distorted incentives regarding financial
statement reporting require more of a "stick" approach to financial
regulation in which consequences result when the issuer deviates
from prescribed accounting standards.
Incentivizing accurate financial reporting instead creates a
"carrot" for U.S. issuers and would presumably place stakeholders
and standard setters on the same side of the fence as all constituencies would presumably work toward the same goal of quality financial reporting. In this environment, all factions would develop
a more cooperative and collaborative relationship instead of one
set of stakeholders (the standard setters and regulators) essentially
being the watch-dog over the other set of stakeholders, the U.S.
issuers.
D. Opposition to Incentivizing Accurate FinancialReporting
It is expected and anticipated that opposition to such a proposal will be great. The first and biggest suggestion would be its
feasibility. Even if all U.S. issuers adopted this proposal would it
improve the financial reporting process in general and would it
clear the path and create a better financial reporting climate for the
U.S. adoption of IFRS? The answer is unclear, but still the present
state of affairs needs improvement while financial fraud continues
to persist in various forms in spite of the government's continuous
mandate of additional regulatory overlays. President Obama
tapped Mary Schapiro to take over the SEC as its next Chairman.
She promised to restore faith and confidence in the SEC by renewing the SEC's commitment to vigorous enforcement. 6 Many appreciate the renewed "get tough on transgressors" speech, but regu-

162.
Phyllis Diamond, et al., Obama Pledges to Reform Landscape; Big
ChangesAhead for Schapiro'sSEC, SEC. L. DAILY, Jan. 26, 2009.
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lators will eventually have to accept the fact that a good crook can
outsmart a good cop any day of the week. Heavy-handed enforcement only creates savvier, more creative accounting "techniques," most of which are likely to fly under the SEC radar.
The idea behind this proposal is to get to the core of the financial accounting problem: stop questionable financial reporting
before it starts. This can be done by creating a dynamic in which
those ultimately responsible for financial statement preparation are
not trying to engage in financial obfuscation but actually have an
incentive to adhere to representational faithfulness in their financial reporting. One definition of insanity is "doing the same thing,
over and over again, but expecting different results."' 163 Vigorous,
renewed, or more heavy-handed enforcement may catch a few additional transgressors and may cause some to reconsider before
actually engaging in questionable accounting. However, true
change can only come when we switch from trying to build bigger
and better dams to redirecting the water flow all together. Both the
paradigm and the mind set must be changed, as well as changing
the approach to achieve quality financial reporting. Those striving
to improve the quality of financial reporting must question what
their resolve is in achieving this objective and the steps they are
willing to take to reach this desired result.
VI. CONCLUSION

The United States is contemplating a shift from U.S. GAAP
to an accounting regime promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board referred to as International Financial Reporting Standards. Some believe that this wholesale shift in accounting and financial reporting is a natural and necessary evolution if
the United States wishes to remain relevant in a global market
place. Over 100 provinces have already made the commitment to
switch to IFRS, and the United States is one of the few countries
with a major global footprint still contemplating the decision.
Some believe the U.S. switch is inevitable, but in light of recent
events such as the current economic crisis and the administration
change at the White House, the move to IFRS is not the foregone
conclusion it once was. If the United States decides to make the
definitive move to IFRS, however, then U.S. issuers, regulators,
163.
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and standard setters alike will have to look at all aspects of the implementation process. The threshold question of U.S. suitability
for LFRS seems to be an issue that has either been overlooked or
under appreciated. LFRS supporters are asking U.S. issuers to
move away from an accounting regime that has been growing roots
since the early 1970s. Such entrenchment will be hard to supplant.
This Article argues that a paradigm shift in the approach toward
financial reporting will have to occur for a successful U.S. shift to
FRS. Currently, U.S. issuers have distorted incentives when it
comes to financial reporting. The use of incentive-based compensation in the form of stock options creates the incentive for U.S.
issuers to "push the envelope" in the financial reporting process in
order to present the financial statements in as favorable a light as
possible. IFRS requires a wholly different mind-set, as IFRS is
premised upon the issuer capturing the "economic substance" of a
transaction. The U.S. issuer's motivations and the tenants of IFRS
are discordant and it is doubtful that the U.S. issuer will automatically change approaches to financial reporting merely because the
United States operates under a different accounting regime. This
Article argues that there must be a catalytic event to "push" the
U.S. issuer in that direction. Incentivizing accurate financial reporting is one suggested approach. Incentivizing accurate financial
reporting will provide the U.S. executive with a vested and personal interest in quality financial reporting versus the prior motivation
of presenting the financial statements as favorably as possible to
protect the value of his or her stock options. Realigning the incentives realigns the focus in financial reporting, thus creating a better
financial and reporting environment more suited for the principlesbased tenants of IFRS. Although this proposal may be contrarian,
perhaps it is time to forage new paths. Perhaps this is an idea
whose time has come.

